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THE DARK SIDE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY: PROTECTING
POLITICAL SPEECH FROM THE USE OF SLAPPS IN NORTH
DAKOTA’S POLITICAL PROCESS
ABSTRACT
A “SLAPP” is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.
SLAPPs are designed to silence individuals by forcing them to spend time
and money to defend themselves in court. They are not designed to be
winning suits based on the merits of the claim. Originally, SLAPPs
involved real estate developers suing anti-developers in tort for interfering
with economic advantage. Their use in silencing political opponents has
taken a new and ugly turn in North Dakota. In Empower the Taxpayer v.
Fong,1 a group promoting Measure 2 on the 2012 primary ballot,
eliminating property taxes in the state, sued dozens of public officials
speaking out against the measure in their capacities as public officials.
Political speech is considered the most protected form of speech in the
United States. This article outlines the history of SLAPPs, identifies the
suit litigated against public officials in North Dakota as a SLAPP, and
addresses the possible remedies and deterrent measures available to
defendants. North Dakota has no specific laws to address the deleterious
effects of SLAPPs on defendants. This article provides judicial and
legislative guidance on remedying their effects on political speech.
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WHAT IS A SLAPP?

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs,2 are
meritless lawsuits designed to silence a defendant by forcing them to spend
time and energy defending themselves in court. SLAPP plaintiffs, by
definition, have improper motives.3 A plaintiff’s motive in an identified
SLAPP is to chill a defendant’s speech or activity and to send a message to
others who echo the defendant’s action.4 SLAPP suits are not brought with
the intention of winning on the merits but to intimidate and harass political
critics into silence.5 The message sent to the critics of SLAPP plaintiffs’
activity presents a disturbing chilling effect and an “attempt to prevent
expected future, competent opposition on subsequent public policy issues;
[and] the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a message that
opposition will be punished . . . .”6 The primary, practical motivations of
SLAPP plaintiffs are delay, expense, and distraction.7 Another motivation
for plaintiffs is to depoliticize the activity by removing the controversy
from the public or legislative realm into the judiciary where the process can
be more easily controlled. This gives the plaintiffs a win-loss scenario, and
thereby further stifle public debate.8 Winning, however, is not the goal of
SLAPP plaintiffs. Defendants win eighty to ninety percent of all SLAPPs
on the merits.9 SLAPPs have an interesting history in the United States and
more than a few states have taken measures to curb their effect.
A. HISTORY OF SLAPPS
Professor George W. Pring in his article SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation10 coined the term “SLAPP” and provides an
2. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1989).
3. Id. at 3-9.
4. John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 395, 403 (1993).
5. Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25,
1991, at 6.
6. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 23,
30 (1989).
7. Barker, supra note 4, at 405.
8. Id.
9. See George W. Pring, “SLAPPs”: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: A
New Ethical, Tactical, and Constitutional Dilemma, C534 ALI-ABA 937, *23, June 25, 1990,
available in WESTLAW, JLR Database.
10. Pring, supra note 2, at 4.
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exhaustive examination of what he terms suits that “stop citizens from
exercising their political rights or to punish them for having done so.”11
SLAPPs date back to the 1970s, involving suits against environmental and
community advocates.
These groups found themselves in a “role
reversal”12 when brought into court by corporations and business interests
to defend their advocacy activities.13 He found four commonalities: “(1) a
civil complaint or counterclaim for monetary damages and/or injunction;
(2) filed against non-governmental individuals and/or groups; (3) because
of their communications to a government body, official, or the electorate;
(4) on an issue of some public interest or concern.”14 His study of SLAPPs
found suits in all corners of judicial activity, including urban/suburban
development and zoning, complaints against public officials and
employees, environmental/animal rights, civil/human rights, neighborhood
problems, and consumer protection.15
SLAPPs were pervasive, despite federal16 and state17 constitutional
provisions, civil rights laws, privilege and immunity statutes, and court
decisions that “expressly protect citizens in their efforts to participate in and
influence governmental decision making.”18 The Petition Clause of the
First Amendment has been expanded to protect any lawful attempt by
citizens to promote or discourage government action at all levels, including
the electorate.19 The right to petition is said to be “among the most precious
of the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights”20 and one of the
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
civil and political institutions.”21 These fundamental principles serve as the
backdrop for the reasons SLAPPs must be identified and quashed. Public
participation in the political process is vital to effective representative
democracy and the free market of ideas.22 SLAPPs run counter to these

11. Id. at 5-6.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 9.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
18. Pring, supra note 2, at 9.
19. Id. (citing S. DOC. NO. 96-16, at 1141-45 (1982); see also Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The
Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-Anti-trust Right to Petition Cases, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1984); John E. Thurman, Annotation, Right of Petition and Assembly
Under Federal Constitution’s First Amendment—Supreme Court Cases, 86 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1987)).
20. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
21. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
22. Pring, supra note 2, at 11-12.
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fundamental principles as violations of “petition-clause-protected
activity.”23
SLAPPs come in the guise of torts against defendants, such as
defamation, business torts (interference with contract, business, economic
expectancy), judicial torts (abuse of process and malicious prosecution),
conspiracy, constitutional-civil rights violations, and nuisance.24 The most
egregious and expensive SLAPPs were originally brought by real estate
developers against private citizens who were opposed to massive
development projects.25 Their voices were suddenly silenced by multimillion dollar lawsuits. One example pitted a developer against nine
homeowner groups who testified against township approval of a proposed
thirty-six home luxury development on prime shorefront acreage.26 The
suit was brought as a libel action with damages in the amount of
$11,200,000.27 The suit was dismissed three and a half years later on
appeal.28 After SLAPPs were identified by legal scholars and their impact
shown, many states moved to address their deleterious effects.
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE ANTI-SLAPP MEASURES
Twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territory of
Guam have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.29 States have developed different
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 13-15.
26. SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 334.
29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to 752 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to
508 (2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136 to
8138 (1999); D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to 5505 (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 720.304(4) (2010); FLA.
STAT. § 768.295 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-7(4) (2000);
7 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 17101-17109 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to 4 (2007); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110/15-/25 ( 2011); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to 10 (2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 971 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 5-807 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2009); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01.05 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241, 246 (2004); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 41.637, .650-.670 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (Supp. 2011); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney Supp. 2012);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150-.155 (Supp. 2011); 27 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8303 (2009); R.I. PUB. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 4 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
4-21-1001 to 1004 (2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001-.011 (Supp. 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1401 to 1405 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.510-.525 (2010). In addition, the Michigan and North
Carolina legislatures, and the U.S. Congress, recently introduced anti-SLAPP bills; however, none
has become law. See Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009); H.B.
5036, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009); Citizen Participation Act, H.B. DRH30241-MH-45,
2011 Gen. Assemb. of N.C. (N.C. 2011). In addition, although Colorado, Connecticut, and West

2013]

NOTE

185

approaches to SLAPPs, some drawn narrowly to protect limited forms of
speech, while others are drawn more broadly.30 The various statutes
provide a “mechanism for a defendant to file a dispositive motion that
requires the plaintiff to come forward with evidence showing the claims are
viable . . . .”31 Attorneys’ fees and other penalties for bringing meritless
claims attempting to stifle the defendant’s free speech or petition rights are
also a hallmark of state anti-SLAPP statutes.32 When an anti-SLAPP
motion is invoked by the defendant, many of the statutes shift the burden to
the plaintiff in the pleading stage to require the plaintiff to show probability
or possibility of success on the merits.33 This is in sharp contrast to the
traditional pleading standard of a “short and plain statement” required by
plaintiffs in civil litigation.34
In states like Arizona, the anti-SLAPP statute narrowly protects
statements to government authorities in the context of an initiative,
referendum or recall effort, statements made to a government body in
connection with an issue up for consideration, or statements made for the
purpose of influencing a government action.35 Statements made to the
general public, such as a letter to the editor of a paper denouncing a
development company’s proposed construction, would not qualify for the
immunity.36 Treating identical statements differently depending on whether
they are in front of a government panel or in a newspaper seems illogical
and antithetical to notions of protected First Amendment freedom of
speech.37
In contrast to Arizona, California’s anti-SLAPP statute is broad and
protects any act of a person in furtherance of that person’s right to petition

Virginia do not have anti-SLAPP statutes, the courts in those states have recognized a common
law defense to lawsuits that retaliate against efforts by citizens to petition the government. See
Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Cos., 90 P.3d 859, 862 (Colo. 2004) (holding that a First
Amendment defense to a retaliatory lawsuit be handled as a motion for summary judgment);
Royce v. Willowbrook Cemetery, Inc., No. XO8CV010185694, 2003 WL 431909 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Feb. 3, 2003) (recognizing that a plaintiff's objectively baseless defamation suit could violate
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993)
(concluding that because the defendant's speech involved the exercise of the right to petition, his
statements were absolutely protected).
30. Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, A View from the First Amendment Trenches:
Washington State’s New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy, 87 WASH. L. REV.
495, 502 (2012).
31. Id. at 502-03.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
35. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-751 (2006).
36. Johnson, supra note 30, at 507.
37. Id.
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or free speech “in connection with a public issue.”38 California defined an
“act in furtherance” broadly as:
[A]ny written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest; . . . or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.39
This broad protection from SLAPPs does seem to invite misuse, as well as
the possibility that the definition of “public interest” could be construed too
broadly by reviewing courts.40
Other states have struggled to strike a medium between the narrow
Arizona style anti-SLAPP statute and California’s broad rendition of the
protective measure. Florida’s statute prevents governmental entities from
filing SLAPPs and prohibits suits regarding statements made in the context
of homeowners’ associations.41 Florida’s statute is a unique example of the
legislature taking notice of the increase in SLAPP lawsuits filed against
private individuals by various commercial entities, but it fails to protect any
speech outside the realm of homeowner association proceedings.42
Washington evolved from protecting only speech made to government
officials43 to adding speech protection if made to the public that relates to a
matter of public concern.44
C. SLAPPS AND POLITICAL SPEECH
SLAPPs have a chilling effect on political speech and an undeniable
negative impact on public participation. Canan identifies four general
motivations of plaintiffs who bring these meritless claims:
(1) The intent to retaliate for successful opposition on an issue of
public interest; (2) the attempt to prevent expected future,
competent opposition on subsequent public policy issues; (3) the
intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a message that
opposition will be punished; and (4) a view of litigation and the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2011).
See id. § 425.16(e).
See discussion infra Part IV.
See FLA. STAT. § 720.304 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (West 2011).
Johnson, supra note 30, 508 n.81.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010).
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525 (2010).
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use of the court system as simply another tool in a strategy to win
a political and/or economic battle.45
Such motivations provide insight into the “total disregard for the
citizenship rights of others and a lack of concern over what reduced
political debate means for American democracy.”46 The effect of one
SLAPP in California chilled the participation of over five hundred families
who wished to comment on the desirability of maximum housing
development in their community.47 In a liberal democracy, free speech is
the cornerstone that allows for efficient and effective self-rule. Here, an
entire community is stunned into silence by a multi-million dollar lawsuit
alleging their complicity in a tortious act of interference with business
advantage, development, or pollution that lacked a countervailing voice to
curb its negative effects on the community.48 The effect travels further
outside of the community as citizens read of significant lawsuits laid at the
feet of those who would dare make statements against unbridled
development.49
The Petition Clause50 facilitates informed political change.51 It is
designed to protect the individual by limiting the ability of government or
entities from stifling political debate. The sovereignty of the individual, in
the context of political discussion, shines as one of our brightest
achievements in American democracy. One writer put it eloquently:
Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be
discussed, it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people
that we must begin.
The principal of the sovereignty of the people, which is always to
be found, more or less, at the bottom of almost all human
institutions, generally remains there concealed from view. It is
obeyed without being recognized, or if for a moment it be brought
to light, it is hastily cast back into the gloom of the sanctuary.
In America, the principle of the sovereignty of the people is not
either barren or concealed, as it is with some other nations; it is
recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the laws; it spreads
freely, and arrives without impediment at its most remote

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Canan, supra note 6, at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Canan, supra note 6, at 31.
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consequences. If there be a country in the world where the doctrine
of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated, where it
can be studied in its application to the affairs of society, and where
its dangers and its advantages may be judged, that country is
assuredly America.52
It is against this backdrop of lofty, fundamental democratic principles
that the purveyors of an insidious SLAPP in North Dakota silenced dozens
of public officials. North Dakota has no specific laws aimed at reducing or
eliminating the effects of SLAPPs. The special-interest group, Empower
the Tax Payer, took full advantage of this deficiency.
II. EMPOWER THE TAXPAYER V. FONG
The ballot initiative process in North Dakota is enshrined in the state’s
constitution.53 While the legislative process is vested in the legislature, “the
people reserve the power to propose and enact laws by the initiative,
including the call for a constitutional convention; to approve or reject
legislative Acts, or parts thereof, by the referendum; to propose and adopt
constitutional amendments by the initiative.”54 Whether this process of
ballot initiative, or direct democracy, is wise for a self-governing people is
beyond the scope of this article. Also beyond the scope of this article, is the
question of whether eliminating North Dakota’s property tax is good public
policy. This article focuses on the deleterious effect the special interest
group, Empower the Taxpayer, had on the political process. In Empower, a
group of public officials was hauled into court for taking a position
allegedly in violation of state law contrary to the proponents of Measure 2.
Measure 2 was placed on the June 12, 2012 primary ballot. The initiative
sought to eliminate property taxes in the state and mandate the legislature
replace the money with different sources of revenue to be distributed to the
various political subdivisions which currently rely on property tax revenue.
The measure read:
This initiated constitutional measure would amend sections 1, 4,
14, 15, and 16 of Article X of the North Dakota Constitution and
repeal sections 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 of that same article, eliminating
property taxes, poll taxes, and acreage taxes, effective January 1,
2012. The measure would require the Legislative Assembly to
replace lost revenue to cities, counties, townships, school districts,
52. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 55-56 (University of Michigan
Press, 1863).
53. N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.
54. Id.
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and other political subdivisions with allocations of various statelevel taxes and other revenues, without restrictions on how these
revenues may be spent by the political subdivisions.55
Empower the Taxpayer, on behalf of itself and signatories to the ballot
initiative, filed an action on February 14, 2012, requesting a temporary
restraining order that defendants comply with the North Dakota Corrupt
Practices Act56 and discontinue distributing false or misleading statements
or take a position on Measure 2.57 After the defendants asserted the suit
was having a chilling effect, the court scheduled a hearing in early April.58
In mid-April, the court issued a decision as a matter of law dismissing the
action.59 The court reflected that North Dakota’s Corrupt Practices Act is a
criminal statute that failed to provide any statutory right to private cause of
action.60 In other words, unless the legislature includes a provision in a
criminal statute for private citizens to sue, no civil right exists to sue in
court.
Seven days before the vote on Measure 2, the North Dakota Supreme
Court heard the appeal.61 The dismissal was affirmed on the same grounds
the lower court posited.62 The court looked to the language of the Corrupt
Practices Act63 as to whether the legislature impliedly intended to create a
private right of action, as it was not expressly state in the Act.64 The court
pointed directly to a 1991 case where the court held that an alleged
violation of the Act65 is not grounds for a civil action.66 The court’s
decision was handed down only two days after oral argument on June 7,

55. Initiated Constitutional Measure No. 2, North Dakota Secretary of State Office, available
at https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Portals/BallotLanguageMeasure2-June12,2012.pdf.
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10 (2011).
57. Brief for Appellant, ¶ 8, Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817 N.W.2d 381,
available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/briefs/20120191.atb.htm.
58. Id. ¶ 10.
59. Id. ¶ 11.
60. Id.
61. Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, ¶ 1, 817 N.W.2d 381, 382. It is
noteworthy to mention that North Dakota is one of the few states that do not regularly employ an
appellate level court. Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court is typically the main
appellate body in the state judiciary. All lower court rulings are appealable by statute to the court.
See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
62. Empower the Taxpayer, ¶ 6, 817 N.W.2d at 384.
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10 (2011).
64. Empower the Taxpayer, ¶ 4, 817 N.W.2d at 383.
65. Id.
66. District One Republican Comm. v. District One Democrat Comm., 466 N.W.2d 820,
827-28 (N.D. 1991). Although in District One the ruling involved an election contest and not a
ballot initiative dispute, the court adopted the reasoning. Empower the Taxpayer, ¶ 5, 817 N.W.2d
at 383.
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2012 and five days before the vote on Measure 2.67 Considering the claim,
the defendants in Empower failed to include any counter-claim for
malicious prosecution, Rule 1168 relief, or request for attorney’s fees.
Sanctions for violation of Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure must be made on motion and can include monetary damages and
other non-monetary sanctions that suffice to deter repetition of the
conduct.69
The court opinion failed to mention anything about the chilling effect
the suit had on the defendants. However, during oral argument Justice
Sandstrom asked the SLAPP plaintiffs’ attorney, “[Y]our interpretation
would say that elected officials surrender their First Amendment rights on
classic political questions, the most protected area under the first
amendment as far as speech is concerned?”70 Three things indicate that this
suit is a classic example of a SLAPP. First, both the lower court and the
Supreme Court spoke to the impact the suit had on the ability of a defendant
to exercise a First Amendment right to free speech. Second, at both levels,
the case was expedited because of those concerns. Third, the high court
handed down its decision affirming the suit’s dismissal a mere two days
after oral argument. Although no specific study of the average length of
time between oral argument and a decision exists, from a cursory gloss of
periods in the past year, parties typically expect a decision published
months after oral arguments. Because of the nature of Empower, and its
implications on a ballot measure vote a mere handful of days from oral
argument, an assumption can be made that the court wished to hand down
its decision as quickly as possible.
Despite the state high court’s efficiency in deciding Empower, the
damage had been done. The state’s tax commissioner, various school board

67. Empower the Taxpayer, at ¶ 5, 817 N.W.2d 384.
68. Arguably, N.D. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(2) was violated when the case was filed in the first
instance in February, 2012. Rule 11 reads:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion,
or other paper, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it, an
attorney or self-represented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law . . . .
Id.
69. N.D. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). Limitations on monetary sanctions are found in N.D. R. CIV. P.
11(c)(5).
70. Oral Argument at 5:01, Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817 N.W.2d 381,
available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/Broadcast/20120191.rm.
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members, state representatives, state senators, and other public officials
with first-hand knowledge and experience with the tax structure of North
Dakota, and the implications of changing the structure, were sued based on
what can be colored as a specious legal argument at best. No legal
authority in statute or case law pointed to plaintiffs’ argument that the
North Dakota Corrupt Practices Act71 provided a private right of action.
These public officials were asked by private citizens to comment on the
effects of Measure 2. They were silenced by Empower the Taxpayer. The
result of Empower the Taxpayer demands that North Dakota take a serious
look at anti-SLAPP measures to protect political speech from SLAPPs’
deleterious effects.
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIAL AND DETERRENT SOLUTIONS
Proponents of anti-SLAPP measures have proposed a myriad of
procedural tools to combat SLAPPs such as court-ordered discovery costs,
specific pleading standards, and accelerated preemptive judicial review.72
These rules could be proffered by the legislature or by the courts.
Substantive remedies include variations on traditional tort defenses and
what are commonly referred to as SLAPP-back measures.73
A. PROCEDURAL REMEDIES
Probably the most basic procedural remedial measure that a party
defending a SLAPP could utilize is specific pleading standards set by the
rules of civil procedure. The current standard in federal court, and most
state courts, including North Dakota, requires a plaintiff to plead “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”74 The pleading standard for claims alleging fraud or mistake require
a heightened standard where a “party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”75 A heightened standard of
pleading for claims thought to be SLAPPs will allow “judicial triage that is
essential to dismiss SLAPPs early.”76 Of course, some procedural
mechanism, such as a defendant pleading stage motion to invoke an antiSLAPP statute, could require plaintiffs to meet the heightened pleading
standard. The value of this pleading standard is evident when utilized in

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10 (2009).
Barker, supra note 4, at 407-09.
Id. at 414-48.
Id. at 407.
FED R. CIV. P. 9(b); N.D. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
Barker, supra note 4, at 407.
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conjunction with other procedural requirements, such as discovery costs,
accelerated review, and dismissal standards.77
Discovery generally incurs the greatest expense for parties in terms of
time and money.78 The liberal discovery rules allowed by rules of civil
procedure are generally to the benefit of SLAPP plaintiffs since one of their
major motivations is to tie up defendants’ time and resources.79 A
dissenting judge in a West Virginia case advocated for the possibility of
amending the rules of procedure to require plaintiffs in identified SLAPPlike claims to pay upfront costs of discovery and legal fees that would be
refundable if the claim was won by the plaintiffs on the merits.80 Another
possible measure allows a special motion to strike that defendants may use
to stay discovery pending a determination of whether the claim is a
SLAPP.81 These discovery measures would alleviate the intimidation
associated with onerous discovery requests and deny SLAPP plaintiffs an
important tool to cause delay and require defendants to incur unaffordable
discovery costs.82
Preventing SLAPPs by expediting judicial proceedings is one of the
most important components of any court or statutory scheme.83 Expediting
the judicial process “will not only alleviate its chilling effect on defendants,
but it will also create disincentives for plaintiffs seeking primarily to delay
and distract their opponents.”84 Some courts, in lieu of anti-SLAPP
procedural statutes, have determined that challenges to plaintiff allegations
based on constitutional rights moves the summary judgment phase back to
77. Id. at 407-08.
78. Id. at 408.
79. See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Victor J. Cosentino, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 407-08 (1991); see also
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers,
542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977)).
The liberal discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer opportunities
for harassment, abuse, and vexatious imposition of expense that can make the mere
pendency of a complex lawsuit so burdensome to defendants as to force them to buy
their peace regardless of the merits of the case.
Id.
80. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 47 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting).
[D]iscovery and the costs of discovery and attendant legal fees themselves may chill
the free exercise of first amendment rights, in appropriate circumstances of gross
imbalance of assets, I would permit the trial court to order the advance of defendant's
costs associated with discovery from plaintiff. Should the plaintiff succeed on the
merits, these payments would be refunded.
Id.
81. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (2011).
82. Barker, supra note 4, at 408.
83. Id.
84. Id.

2013]

NOTE

193

the dismissal stage of the pre-trial process.85 California implemented a
standard of review which subjects claims involving First Amendment rights
and a “public issue” to an immediate motion to strike and review of whether
or not the plaintiff has a “probability” of prevailing on the merits.86
The standard of dismissal poses a challenge to anti-SLAPP procedural
measures as courts dislike dismissing claims at the demurrer stage of
litigation.87 The rules of civil procedure at the pre-discovery phase will
typically only allow dismissal if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”88 Implementing a standard of review for potential SLAPPs would
involve judicial review of the “probability” or “possibility” of the plaintiff
winning on the merits outlined in the pre-discovery phase; though using the
term “probability” would likely invoke a preponderance test and
“possibility” would likely utilize a substantial evidence test.89 Both tests
would also likely require some level of evidence, perhaps submitted by
affidavit, speaking to the merits of the claim.90 These tests could be
codified by statute or courts could use their common-law holdings in cases
to act separately.
All of these procedural remedies to protect defendants against
unwarranted, meritless claims could be employed in some version by the
legislature of the state of North Dakota or by the Supreme Court. In terms
of Empower, the lower court, prompted by the defendants, did the right
thing and expedited hearing the case when the chilling effect of speech was
asserted.91 The process could have been further expedited if an accelerated
review mechanism had been in place. Also, an accelerated appellate review
measure could have moved the case more quickly to the high court where

85. See Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Colo. 1984).
86. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (2011).
87. Barker, supra note 4, at 409.
88. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); North Dakota
follows the federal standard set forth in Conley. See also Rose v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 2001
ND 154, ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d 429, 434 (citing Johnson & Maxwell, Ltd. v. Lind, 288 N.W.2d 763,
765 (N.D.1980). Massachusetts also follows the federal standard set forth in Conley. Bell v.
Mazza, 474 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Mass. 1985). Similarly, in New York a defendant must show
“‘conclusively that [the] plaintiff has no cause of action.’ [And] that, in light of the evidence
presented, ‘no significant dispute exists.’” SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 517
N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (citations omitted). Colorado courts will dismiss “if
recovery would be constitutionally prohibited, and . . . such infirmity appears on the face of the
complaint.” Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Ass’n, 670 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Colo. App. 1983).
89. Barker, supra note 4, at 411-13.
90. Id. at 409-13.
91. Brief for Appellant, ¶ 10, Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817 N.W.2d
381, available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/_court/briefs/20120191.atb.htm.
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the dismissal was affirmed. A heightened pleading standard would also
have moved the case quickly through the process. These measures deal
mainly with the pleading stage of the SLAPP. Substantive anti-SLAPP
measures to complement the procedural measures are available as well.
B. SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES
Substantive remedies include variations on traditional tort defenses,
duties owed to the court, and other common defensive counterclaims or
countersuits referred to as SLAPP-backs. The implementation of most
substantive remedies relies heavily on the courts to use holdings in case law
that potentially benefit a defendant in SLAPPs. Privileges, certain forms of
immunities, and attorney’s fees are also aspects of substantive statutory law
possibly helpful to SLAPP defendants.
The best defense to a SLAPP is to be informed of the possibility of
becoming a SLAPP defendant due to your actions.92 Citizens concerned
with SLAPPs in some of the more common claims may take specific
measures.93 In considering speaking out against a powerful real estate
developer or public figure, citizens would be wise to avoid personal or ad
hominem attacks, insults, or inflammatory statements.94 Advocacy groups
can nullify some of the more serious outcomes by incorporating and
purchasing insurance that would cover potential litigation arising from their
activities.95 These practical, prophylactic measures hardly soften the blow
of SLAPPs and are inadequate if a lay person unfamiliar with the workings
of the court system finds themselves victims of a SLAPP.
Also inadequate, but presently available, are provisions in attorney
ethical codes that carry with them sanctions designed to deter bad
behavior.96 Under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an attorney may
not file suit to only harass or delay.97 Under the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the lawyer need not subjectively believe the
argument will prevail; however, the lawyer must believe an argument is
made in good faith including that modification or reversal of existing law
be made in good faith.98 Rule 11 violations, and violations of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility are generally difficult to prove and sanctions do

92. Barker, supra note 4, at 414.
93. Id. at 414-15.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 416.
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); N.D. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(2) (see supra note 68 for full text).
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3.1 (2006).
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not in general provide enough deterrence to SLAPP plaintiffs and their
counsel.99 In Empower, defendants offered no motion to the court that Rule
11 had been violated. One explanation is that it would extend the dispute
further since plaintiffs’ attorneys are afforded the opportunity to defend
their actions which requires more pleading and briefing on issues related to
the violation. Again, the motivation of forcing defendants to incur costs
and spend time would be satisfied in some respect with further litigation.
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances offers
citizens a cognizable privilege to political advocacy.100 The First
Amendment right includes “the right of public debate, including the right to
publish truthful statements, the right to demonstrate in public, and the right
to report violations or make complaints to government bodies.”101 The
right to petition is powerful, and one of the most effective defenses to
SLAPPs that involve private citizens making statements to governmental
bodies or the public in general.102 Courts have stressed time and again the
fundamental importance of the right to petition.103 Even if a SLAPP
defendant does not raise the petition privilege, it is not considered
waived.104 The right to petition does not rely on the outcome of the case
based on its merits; instead it is a nearly absolute privilege collateral to any
tort liability alleged or proven by a plaintiff.105 A defendant having a
financial or personal interest at stake in the SLAPP does not overcome the
petition privilege.106 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,107 or the sham

99. Barker, supra note 4, at 419.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101. Paula Goedert, The SLAPP Suit Threat: Squelching Public Debate, 22 AM. LIBR. 1003,
1003 (1991).
102. Barker, supra note 4, at 426.
103. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); Sierra
Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Matossian v. Fahmie, 161 Cal. Rptr. 532,
535 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App.
1961); see also Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting “it is clear beyond
peradventure that [the right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances] is
at the core of protected First Amendment speech . . . .”).
104. See Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Ass’n, 670 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Colo. App.1983).
105. See Matossian, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 535-36.
106. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
This landmark case extended the petitioning privilege to defendants who were financially
interested in the subject matter of their petitioning and were therefore inferably malicious or at
least selfishly motivated.
107. The original line of cases articulating the Supreme Court’s sham exception rules was in
the antitrust area. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at
144. Subsequent courts, however, have applied the sham exception outside the antitrust setting.
See, e.g., Matossian, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 536; Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. District Court, 677
P.2d 1361, 1366 (Colo. 1984).
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exception rule, states that petitioning cannot be “completely to prevent a
competitor from gaining access to government; the petitioner must be
genuinely seeking redress.”108 In Empower, defendants could have made a
claim of petition privilege based on their right of free speech and privilege
to take part in the political process. Although it seems counterintuitive,
since they are public officials not petitioning the government, the privilege
includes petition to the electorate and a general privilege of participating in
public discourse.109
SLAPP-backs generally involve claims for malicious prosecution
and/or abuse of process.110
SLAPP-backs are only effective as
counterclaims and may be too little, too late.111 They generally involve a
large damage award112 if successful and are highly publicized, but very
rarely do they succeed.113 Their main drawback is SLAPP-backs fail to
“actually prevent the negative effects of SLAPPs, such as delay, initial cost,
and intimidation.”114
Abuse of process in terms of SLAPP-backs involves claiming the suit
is proper or legitimate but for some improper, collateral purpose.115 The
elements of an abuse of process counterclaim are: (1) an “ulterior motive,”
(2) wrongful use of process, and (3) proximate causation of damage or
harm.116 A SLAPP defendant must prove the plaintiff used the initial suit
as a threat or blackmail.117 These elements, especially “ulterior motive,”
are difficult to prove as with most lawsuits that require an explanation of
motive. Abuse of process is procedural in that it is unrelated to the merits
of the original SLAPP.118 Unlike malicious prosecution, which attacks the
merits of the SLAPP, abuse of process seeks to prove the initial suit was
used “as a threat or a club . . . a form of extortion.”119

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Barker, supra note 4, at 428.
See discussion infra Part I.A., note 19.
Barker, supra note 4, at 431.
Id.
Id. at 431-32.
Id.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id. at 434.
Id.
Spellens v. Spellens, 317 P.2d 613, 627 (1957) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
PROSSER ON TORTS § 100 (2d. ed. 1955)); see also Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg,
Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 575 (1986) (explaining that “lack of probable
cause” element of malicious prosecution cannot be circumvented by expanding abuse of process
to encompass alleged improper filing of lawsuit).
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Malicious prosecution, on the other hand, requires: (1) the original
SLAPP plaintiff won the initial action; (2) the SLAPP plaintiff must not
have had probable cause to bring the suit; and (3) the SLAPP defendant as
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution claim must show the original SLAPP
was filed for an improper purpose.120 “In malicious prosecution, the filing
of the suit itself is improper because the plaintiff had no probable cause and
a malicious purpose.”121 The defense to malicious prosecution is “advice of
counsel” which requires that the defendant had sought and followed the
lawyer’s advice and followed it before commencing or maintaining the
action and had made “full, fair and complete disclosure” to the attorney of
all relevant information.122 And, the defendant must have actually believed
the plaintiff was liable.123 The advantage of a malicious prosecution is the
potential for large damage awards.124 The drawback is delay caused by the
required element that the original SLAPP plaintiff won the SLAPP suit.125
The defendants in Empower could have pursued any number of the
aforementioned options. The fact that they did not may speak to their
inadequacy as deterrents. Attorney’s fees and punitive damages are
available to plaintiffs of successful SLAPP-back counterclaims and are
largely determined by state law limits on awards. It would be fitting for the
legislature to consider tailoring larger damage awards for counterclaims
involving SLAPPs if only to publicize their displeasure with SLAPPs and,
hopefully, deter potential SLAPP plaintiffs. A close look to a jurisdiction
like California, with a history of anti-SLAPP legislation and case law, may
provide insight into how North Dakota might best protect political speech in
the context of SLAPPs.
IV. CALIFORNIA’S HISTORY WITH SLAPPS
California enacted its first anti-SLAPP law in 1992.126 Since then, it
has been amended six times.127 Since anti-SLAPP measures are relatively
new in American jurisprudence, many issues arose out of early

120. Id.
121. Barker, supra note 4, at 435.
122. Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law
for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 444 n.87 (1991).
123. Id.
124. Barker, supra note 4, at 434.
125. Id. at 434-35.
126. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 726 (West).
127. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1239 (West); 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 960 (West);
2005 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 535 (West); 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 65 (West); 2010 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 328 (West).
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applications.128 Most questions have been answered as the statute has
matured.129 The questions most vital for examination in this article as
potential difficulties the North Dakota courts might encounter involve
scope, discovery, and the award of attorney’s fees to successful SLAPP
defendants.
A. CALIFORNIA: A MODEL FOR NORTH DAKOTA?
One of the threshold issues that California faced in applying its
relatively new anti-SLAPP statute was its reach and scope.130 California
courts wrestled with whether the special motion to strike131 required a
defendant to show that the lawsuit was initiated with a forbidden purpose.
The California Supreme Court in Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer
Cause, Inc.132 held the defendant need not make a showing of improper
purpose and the subjective intent of the SLAPP plaintiff is immaterial.133
The court stated “a neutral, easily applied definition for SLAPP’s avoids
subjective judgments about filers’ or targets’ motives, good faith, or
intent.”134 In a companion case, the court also addressed whether to apply
an intent-to-chill test on the plaintiff’s motives.135 Subjective intent of
SLAPP plaintiffs is difficult to prove with certainty. Thus, the court stuck
to the objective legal standard of whether the chilling occurred.136
Similarly, the courts struggled early as to whether the statute should be
applied in “paradigm” cases.137 That is, should the statute solely serve to

128. Jerome I. Braun, California’s Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years, 34 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 731, 735 (2003).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 736-37.
131. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (1995).
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of
the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
Id.
132. 52 P.3d 685 (Cal. 2002).
133. Braun, supra note 128, at 737.
134. Equilon Enterpises, 52 P.3d at 690 (internal quotations omitted). The Court also noted
that an “intent to chill” requirement could conflict with the privilege statute, Civil Code section
47. “Were we to impose an intent-to-chill proof requirement, petitioning that is absolutely
privileged under the litigation privilege would be deprived of anti-SLAPP protection whenever a
moving defendant could not prove that the plaintiff harbored an intent to chill that activity. Our
construction avoids that anomalous result.” Id. Finally, the Court referred to policy reasons
against imposing such a requirement. Id. at 692-93.
135. City of Cotati v. Cashman, 52 P.3d 695 (Cal. 2002).
136. Braun, supra note 128, at 737-38.
137. Id. at 738.
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quash attempts by large land developers from silencing their critics, or
should it apply more broadly to various defendants facing a SLAPP’s
chilling effect?138 It eventually became accepted that the anti-SLAPP
measure applied broadly and “[b]oth legislative mandate and judicial
interpretation have expanded the application of the anti-SLAPP statute
beyond its paradigmatic origins.”139 Questions also arose as what was
meant by “a public issue or an issue of public interest.”140 In Rivero v.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,141 the
court held broadly the public issue requirement of the statute was met
where “the subject statements . . . concerned a person or entity in the public
eye, conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the
direct participants[,] or a topic of widespread, public interest.”142 The
California courts broadened the application of public issue even further,
stating:
More particular questions about the reach of the statute also have
been answered. Speech by governments and public officials is
covered by the statute.143 Speech by mail is covered.144 Things
said about candidates or issues in an election campaign are
covered.145 The same seems to be true of prominent election
participants who are not themselves candidates.146 Union elections
138. Id.
139. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 508 (Ct. App. 2001); Vess v. CibaGeigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003). Years earlier, Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 880, 885 (Ct. App. 1995), held the same way: although the paradigm “provides useful
background regarding SLAPP suits, we are governed by familiar rules of statutory interpretation
in evaluating whether section 425.16 can be applied to this action.” Id. As the statute provided no
paradigmatic limitation, the courts would not add one. Id.
140. Braun, supra note 128, at 745.
141. 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (Ct. App. 2003).
142. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
143. See Bradbury v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that the
statute covers district attorney’s speech); Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 11 (Ct. App. 1998) (ruling county government speech is protected); Schroeder v.
Irvine City Council, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 337 n. 3 (Ct. App. 2002) (ruling city council speech is
protected). In Schroeder, the court inserted a disclaimer into its footnote, saying “we do not
categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically
qualify for treatment under section 425.16. . . .” Id.
144. See Macias v. Hartwell, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 225 (Ct. App. 1997).
145. See, e.g., Conroy v. Spitzer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 447-48 (Ct. App. 1999). Section
425.16 applies to suits involving statements made during a political campaign, statements made in
connection with a recall election, statements made in a political flyer concerning a candidate and
statements made in a recall petition. Macias, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222-24. Roberts v. Los Angeles
Cnty. Bar Ass’n., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 552 (Ct. App. 2003) (Bar Association’s evaluation of
judicial candidate). “Our Constitution protects everyone—even politicians.” Beilenson v.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 359 (Ct. App. 1996).
146. See Sipple v. Found for Nat'l Progress, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 685 (Ct. App. 1999)
(“[T]he details of appellant’s career and appellant’s ability to capitalize on domestic violence
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count as elections for this purpose.147 But although activities
related to an election are covered, where the election-related
activity is itself illegal, the statute offers no protection, because the
activity was not a “valid” exercise of constitutional rights as stated
in the preamble.148 It does not matter whether the speech is made
on behalf of others,149 and “[t]here is no requirement that the
writing or speech be promulgated directly to the official body,150
recruiting and encouraging others to speak out on a matter of
public interest [comes] within the protection of section 425.16.151”
For the purpose of analysis in the context of scope and reach, the above
list deals mainly with types of political speech that should be protected
from SLAPPs in North Dakota. Although seemingly broad, the above
forms of protected speech address California’s treatment of the type of
political activity found in Empower.
The California courts also dealt with their discretionary role in limiting
or granting discovery when a plaintiff is attempting to show a prima facie
case.152 Subsection (g) of the statute provides:
All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the
filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay
of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order
ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good
cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted
notwithstanding this subdivision.153

issues in his advertising campaigns for politicians known around the world, while allegedly
committing violence against his former wives, are public issues, and the article is subject to the
protection of section 425.16.”).
147. See Macias, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
148. See Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 866-67 (Ct. App. 2001)
(discussing the laundering of campaign contributions). Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16(a)
(2003) (“the valid exercise of the constitutional rights . . .). In Paul for Council, “the court noted
that the probability that the Legislature intended to give defendants section 425.16 protection from
a lawsuit based on injuries they are alleged to have caused by their illegal campaign money
laundering scheme is as unlikely as the probability that such protection would exist for them if
they injured plaintiff while robbing a bank to obtain the money for the campaign contributions or
while hijacking a car to drive the campaign contributions to the post office for mailing. Under the
facts demonstrated by this record, we cannot permit defendants to wrap themselves in this vital
legislation.” Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871.
149. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1999).
150. Ludwig v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 357 (Ct. App. 1995).
151. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 835 (Ct. App.
1996) (citing Ludwig, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357); see also Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr.
2d 446, 456-57 (Ct. App. 1994); Braun, supra note 128, at 745-47.
152. Id. at 763.
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (2011).
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California courts have held that unless there is a showing the matter
proposed to be discovered materially implicates the elements of the prima
facie showing in order to avoid a strike, a court may deny and stay the
request.154 The threshold requirement here seems reasonable in the context
of a possible suit that has the potential to chill the type of political speech
found in Empower.
How and when to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a
SLAPP suit has posed two major problems for the California courts. First,
if a SLAPP plaintiff is subject to a motion to strike and voluntarily
dismisses the suit, whether attorney’s fees should be awarded has become
an issue in the courts.155 One court held that a defendant was not required
by statute to receive fees after the SLAPP was dismissed prior to a ruling on
the motion to strike.156 Second is the determination of what is a
“reasonable” fee within the discretion of the court.157 Both of these
questions regarding attorney’s fee awards to prevailing defendants would
fall within the discretion of North Dakota judges. The award of fees is an
important tool, not just deter SLAPP suits, but to guarantee that SLAPP
defendants are not rolled over by interests with deep pockets. The ultimate
goal of these measures is to level the playing field to a degree where
plaintiffs will think twice before deciding to bring a SLAPP suit to silence
their political or economic opponents.
In Empower, California’s motion to strike anti-SLAPP measure would
have expedited the process and un-chilled the public officials’ rights to
political speech. The question here is whether North Dakota should broadly
apply the SLAPP statutes to protect all manner of public interest issues, or
narrowly draft a statute to cover only the political speech that was denied in
Empower. I would advocate for somewhere in the middle. The statute
should not be so narrow that it only covers public officials and their petition
privilege to make statements to the electorate. Instead, it should be tailored
to protect the political speech itself. It seems simple to assume that only
public officials could be subject to the type of suit that Empower the
Taxpayer brought. Speech is the object of protection. It just so happens
that a SLAPP affected the political speech of public officials in Empower.
Nor should the political speech be protected with anti-SLAPP legislation in
the context of only ballot initiatives. The protection proffered in such

154. Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 343 (Ct. App. 2002).
155. Braun, supra note 128, at 764.
156. Coltrain v. Shewalter, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 608 (Ct. App. 1998).
157. See Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 638 (Ct. App. 1996);
Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
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legislation should protect all political activity, including, but not limited to,
elections, advocacy, notice and comment, and union organizing.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, there seems to be little dispute that political speech should be
protected from the chilling effects of meritless lawsuits. SLAPPs are a
common tool that powerful interests use to silence, delay, diffuse, or
otherwise gain unfair political advantage. Empower the Taxpayer, as a
citizen group, took full advantage of North Dakota’s lack of anti-SLAPP
measures when they brought dozens of public officials into court. North
Dakota’s court system wisely rejected the suit, but the damage had been
done. As a liberal democratic society, we want public officials and the
electorate to have a rigorous debate of the issues. If the public does not like
the outcomes, the ballot box should be the final arbiter. Over half of the
states have passed laws to deal with the deleterious effect of SLAPPs. The
substantive and procedural mechanisms mentioned here provide guidance
to North Dakota’s legislature and courts. Political speech is of vital
importance to our democracy and should be protected when the occasion
calls for it. This is such an occasion.
Brent Jaenicke
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